Play as · WW3 2026 · L1 · AES military transition

Mali - 2026

Mali begins September 2026 under General Assimi Goïta, still formally president of the transition more than five years after the second of the 2020 and 2021 coups placed him at the centre of power. The political order presents sovereignty and state recovery as its mandate, while competitive elections remain deferred and civic space narrowed. Mali helped create the Confederation of Sahel States with Burkina Faso and Niger and left ECOWAS effective 29 January 2025. Goïta transferred the rotating AES presidency to Ibrahim Traoré in December 2025, but Mali remains central to the confederation's institutions. In June 2026 he received the new commander of the AES unified force in Bamako, confirming that joint security planning has moved beyond a treaty announcement. This regional architecture operates after several earlier systems ended: French forces withdrew, and MINUSMA completed its departure in December 2023 at the government's request. Russian personnel remain an important security partner. None of those changes settles who controls roads, protects villages or provides justice in Mali's north and centre.

Starting position

The armed forces hold major towns and can project power with aircraft, drones and external support, but distance and supply impose harder limits than nominal troop strength. JNIM attacks state forces, communities and economic routes across several regions; Islamic State operates in the northeast; and northern armed movements contest the post-2015 political settlement. The recapture of Kidal in 2023 changed the military map without resolving Tuareg grievances or the administration of a vast desert. Build operations around protected roads, reliable garrisons and civilian teams able to remain after combat. Investigate abuses by Malian or foreign partners, because collective punishment trades tactical access for durable insurgent recruitment. The economy depends on gold exports, cotton, livestock and commerce through neighbours' ports. Mali's AES alignment has not removed dependence on corridors through Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Mauritania. Fuel disruption quickly affects transport, power and food prices. The Niger River, irrigated agriculture and pastoral routes require negotiated access as rainfall varies; local violence often grows when officials treat land and water disputes as merely counterterrorism problems.

What turns the campaign

Your first turns force a choice between concentrated military command and a state that can receive unwelcome information. Officials who fear reporting an insecure road will produce clean maps and failed convoys. Give district administrators, traders, herders and village representatives protected channels to describe threats, and judge commanders by civilian access as well as enemy casualties. The AES unified force can share intelligence and pursue groups across borders, but it needs written command, detention and supply rules so each member cannot disown mistakes. Russian assistance offers capabilities no longer supplied through the former French system; contracts, chains of command and civilian-harm procedures still need Malian oversight. Politically, a transition without a credible exit invites every reform to depend on Goïta personally. Publish a sequenced constitutional and electoral path, reopen lawful party activity and let courts examine security measures. Negotiation with armed actors will be controversial, but separating locally rooted disputes from transnational groups can reduce the number of enemies the state attempts to fight at once.

Signature challenge